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STATE OF UTAH 
JEROME H. MOONEY, 
Plaintiff/Respondent/ 
vs. 
GR AND ASSOCIATES; a Utah 
corporation, GRANT H. ROYLANCE, 
and individual, CONSOLIDATED MINING 
AND MILLING, a Utah corporation, 
C & H INVESTMENTS, a Utah 
partnership, COURTNEY WRATHALL, an 
individual, and CHARLES I- HAGAN, 
an individual, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No- 20227 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a "Judgment" entered in the District Court, 
Fourth Judicial District, Utah County, State of Utah, pursuant to which 
appellant Charles's I. Hagan's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied and 
respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted so as to award respondent 
judgment against appellant for the sum of $457,819.95 plus interest at the 
rate of 15% per annum from July 27, 1984, compounded annually, and costs in 
the sum of $201.50 plus attorney's fees in the sum of $11,400.00, 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT 
Appellant, by this appeal, seeks reversal of the trial Court's 
Judgment dated and entered on September 7, 1984. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the trial Court appellant and respondent entered into a 
"Stipulation to Facts" which was filed with the trial Court and which stated 
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each and every fact before the trial Court at the time appellant and 
respondent's Motions for Summary Judgment were considered by the trial 
Court. 
The judgment appealed from denied appellant's Motion for Surrmary 
Judgment/ granted respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and was based 
entirely upon the facts contained in the parties' "Stipulation to Fact." 
Therefore/ since all of the facts before the trial Court were stipulated 
to by the parties1 to this Appeal/ there is absolutely no controversy 
concerning the facts in the case. 
The parties' Stipulation to Facts/ including all exhibits attached 
thereto/ is a part of the record filed with this Court. The parties' 
"Stipulation to Facts" (exhibits excluded) provides as follows: 
"1. On October 15, 1976, Plaintiff, Jerome H. Mooney and 
his wife, Bonnie S. Mooney, Donald K. Bailey and his wife, 
Dorothy Bailey, Hal J. Drinkhaus and his wife, Elizabeth B. 
Drinkaus/ as sellers of real estate located in Salt Lake 
County/ State of Utah/ entered into a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract with C&H Investments/ Inc. as buyers of which 
Defendant/ Charles I. Hagan and Courtney Wrathall respectively, 
the president and vice presidentof the alleged corporation. 
A person guarantee upon the contract was executed by Defendant 
Charles I. Hagan. 
2. During 1978, Plaintiff and Defendants, C&H Investments, 
Wrathall and Hagan, agreed to convey certain real property in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to Defendant GR and Associates 
in return for cash and promissory notes which were to be executed 
by the remaining Defendant and which were to be secured by an 
interest in milling equipment owned by Defendant Consolidated 
Mining and Milling. 
3. That at the time of the conveyance to GR and Associates, 
Plaintiff owned a sellers interest in the subject real property 
and Defendants C&H Investments, Courtney Wrathall/ and Charles I. 
Hagan/ owned a purchasers interest in said real property pursuant 
to a Uniform Real Estate Contract. A copy of said contract is 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit A. 
4. On August 17, 1978, Plaintiff received a promissory note 
in the principal sum of Two Hundred Ninety-Five Thousand, Seven 
Hundred Fifty-Six Dollars and Forty-Two Cents ($295,756.42), 
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together with interest from the date at the rate of Fifteen 
Percent (15%) per annum on the unpaid balance, payable at the 
rate of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) per month until 
August 17, 1979, when the remaining principal and interest would 
all be due and payable. The promissory note was executed by 
Defendant GR & Associates, Inc., by Grant H. Roylance, president, 
Defendant, Grant H. Roylance, as an individual, by Defendant 
Consolidated Mining and Milling, Inc., by Grant H. Roylance, 
president, by Defendant C&H Investments, a Utah partnership, 
by Defendants Courtney Wrathall and Charles I. Hagan. In 
exchange therefore, Plaintiff and Plaintiff's partners released 
all interest that they had in the subject real rntate, by warranty 
deed. A copy of said promissory note is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference as Plaintiff's Exhibit B. 
5. Simultaneously with Plaintiff's sale, Defendants, C£H 
Investments, Wrathall and Hagan, conveyed their interest in 
the subject real property to Defendant GR and Associates/ and 
received promissory notes therefore. A copy of the promissory 
note between Defendants C&H Investment and Grant H. Roylance, 
individually/ Consolidated Mining and Milling, by Grant H. 
Roylance, president, and GR and Associate, Inc., by Grant H. 
Roylance, president, is attached hereto and incorporated herein 
by reference as Defendant's Exhibit 1. 
6. Plaintiff's promissory note was secured by an interest 
in milling equipment then cwned by Defendant Consolidated Mining 
and Milling, Inc. A copy of the UCC-1, as filed with the 
Lieutenant Governor's office, is attached hereto, and incorporated 
herein by reference as Plaintiff's Exhibit C. 
7. Guardian Title Company acted as the escrow agent for the 
closing of the aforesaid transactions on August 17, 1978. 
8. At the closing/ although there were no written escrcw 
instructions/ it was understood by the parties to this litigation 
that Guardian was to file the UCC-1 security interest concurrently 
and simultaneously with recordation of title to the subject real 
estate, the recording of .said document to occur immediately after 
execution, and plaintiff so instructed Guardian. 
9. The parties to this litigation intended that the security 
interest evidenced by the UCC-1 was to be a first-place security 
interest on the full and fair market value of said security without 
lien or encumbrance and reasonably relied upon said understanding, 
in entering into the transaction described hereinabove. 
10. Plaintiff instructed Guardian Title Company to exercise 
due diligence to establish that Plaintiff in fact would be 
receiving a first-place security interest in the subject milling 
equipment at the time of closing. 
11. The parties to this litigation reasonably believed at 
the date of closing that said security had a fair market value 
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sufficient to conpletely satisfy the full amount of indebtedness 
evidenced by the promissory note at issue and the parties, 
reasonably relied upon said understanding, Plaintiff having 
obtained an appraisal of said property prior to said transaction 
shewing a fair-market value in excess of five hundred thousand 
dollars ($500,000.00). 
12. Defendant Charles I. Hagan executed said promissory 
note in reasonable reliance upon the aforementioned stipulated 
facts and would not have done so without said facts. 
13. After commencing this case of action, the Parties 
discovered that Sandy State Bank had a prior perfected security 
interest in the subject milling equipment, with additional yard 
and chemical equipment listed, filed with the State of Utah 
on July 10, 1978. A copy of Sandy State Bank's UCC-1, as filed 
with the State of Utah is attached hereto and incorporated herein 
by reference as Plaintiff's Exhibit D. 
14. Plaintiff's security interest was not perfected by 
Plaintiff or Guardian Title until August 22, 1978, after a 
security interest in said property, and including additional 
yard and chemical laboratory equipment, was perfected by Penguin 
Investments, an entity which is not a party to these proceedings, 
on August 21, 1978. A copy of said security interest as recorded 
with the State of Utah is attached hereto and incorporated herein 
by reference as Plaintiff's Exhibit E. 
15. Payment of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) per month 
were made during the months of September and October. The payment 
due on November 17, 1978, was not submitted to Plaintiff until 
after this lawsuit was commenced. At that time, Plaintiff 
discovered that the security interest in the milling equipment 
had been subordinated to a prior security interest given to Penquin 
Investments, subsequent to the time that the documents were 
executed on August 17, 1978. Plaintiff's financing statement was 
filed with the Secretary of State of August 22, 1978 by Guardian 
Title. Deeming his security impaired, Plaintiff continued to 
proceed under the default provisions of the said promissory note 
to declare the entire principal sum due and payable. A copy of 
the payment ledger is attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
reference as Plaintiff's Exhibit F. 
16. Plaintiff attached the assets of Consolidated Mining 
and Milling immediately, but took nothing thereby; the security 
being insufficient to satisfy the obligations of prior security 
holders. A List of Creditors and Priority of Such Claims as 
prepared by Dan Randall, Receiver for Consolidated Mining and 
Milling, is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit B. 
17. The property, subject to said security interest, was even-
tually sold by the prior lien-holder, Penguin Investments, for Three 
Hundred Thirty Thousand Dollars ($330,000.00) on April 9, 1980. 
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18. A stipulation to enter judgment was entered between 
Plaintiff and Defendants, Grant H. Roylance, GR and Associates, 
and Consolidated Mining and Milling on March 30, 1979. On 
April 2, 1979, Defendants Courtney Wrathall and Charles I. Hagan 
stipulated and agreed to such entry of judgment regarding the 
other defendants. 
19. Other than the initial Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00) 
paid upon the note, and since the tender of the Four Thousand 
Dollars ($4,000.00) in November of 1978, Plaintiff has neither 
received nor been tendered any sums toward payment on said note. 
20. Including interest, there is presently due and out-
standing on said note, the sum of Pour Hundred Fifty-Seven 
Thousand Eight Hundred Nineteen Dollars and Ninety-Five Cents 
($457,819.95) as of July 27, 1984. 
21. That said promissory note provides for the payment of 
accrued interest and costs, including reasonable attorneys fees. 
22. That Defendants, C&H Investments, Wrathall and Hagan 
did reasonably rely upon their being a perfected first-place 
security interest in executing said promissory note. Plaintiff, 
having the same understanding as Defendants, knew of said reliance, 
but insisted that said Defendants execute upon said note as 
additional collateral. 
23. That Defendant, C&H Investments, Wrathall and Hagan, 
have never consented to the failure to properly perfect Plaintiff's 
security interest in the subject mining equipment. 
24. That at the time the subject promissory note was executed, 
Plaintiff and Defendants, C&H Investments, Wrathall and Hagan, 
were all acting under a mistaken fact, to-wit: that said promissory 
note would be secured by the subject milling equipment and that 
said security interest would have a value equal to or greater 
than the amount due under said note. 
25. That the present parties would not have accepted or 
executed the promissory note if they had known either that 
Plaintiff would not receive a first priority security interest 
in the subject mining equipment or that there would be a delay 
in perfecting Plaintiff's security interest." 
Based upon the Stipulation to Facts recited hereinabove appellant 
and respondent filed cross Motions for Summary Judgment wherein respondent 
claimed to be entitled to judgment against appellant based upon the terms of 
the promissory note dated August 17, 1978. Appellant sought summary judgment 
dismissing plaintiff's Complaint. 
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO FIND THAT APPELLANT WAS 
AND ACCOMMODATION PARTY ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE OF AUGUST 17, 1978, AND 
IMPROPERLY FAILED TO HOLD THAT APPELLANT HAD BEEN DISCHARGED FROM ANY 
OBLIGATION ON SAID PROMISSORY NOTE DUE TO RESPONDENT'S UNJUSTIFIABLE 
IMPAIRMENT OF THE COLLATERAL FOR THE PROMISSORY NOTE. 
Utah Code, Section 70A-3-606 provides in part as follows: 
"(1) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the 
extent that without such party's consent the holder 
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument 
given by or on behalf of the party or any person against whom he 
has a right of recourse," 
As shown by the parties' Stipulation to Facts, it was intended by the 
parties that the promissory note respondent's suit is based upon would be secured 
by certain equipment which had a value in excess of the amount of the 
promissory note. (Stipulation to Facts, paragraphs 9 and 11) 
The reason appellant signed the subject promissory note was to 
provide respondent with "additional collateral". (Stipulation to Facts, 
paragraph 22) Appellant was, therefore, an accommodation party. Utah 
Code Section 70A-3-415 (1). 
In addition, the promissory note and security interest belonged to 
respondent and Guardian Title Company was instructed by respondent to immediately 
record said security interest so as to give respondent a first place security 
interest in the subject collateral. (Stipulation to Facts, paragraphs 8 and 10) 
Appellant never consented to the failure of Guardian Title Coirpany 
to properly perfect plaintiff's security interest in the subject collateral. 
(Stipulation to Facts, paragraph 23) 
In Shaffer vs. Davidson, Wyoming, 445 P.2d 13, plaintiff 
brought suit against an accommodation maker on a promissory note which was 
to be secured by a chattel mortgage upon an automobile. The chattel mortgage 
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was delivered to the plaintiff but the plaintiff neither filed the chattel 
mortgage nor delivered the certificate of title to the proper officer to enable 
endorsement of the chattel mortgage thereon. 
The third party sold the automobile and disappeared and neither he nor 
the car could later be found. 
The Wyoming Court; at 445 P.2d 14/ stated the issues in the 
case to be as follows: 
"Under these facts, the questions presented to the trial Court 
were (1) Was Shaffer required to afford Mrs. Davidson the protection 
of whatever security the chattel mortgage provided her? and (2) 
Was Shaffer's failure to record the chattel mortgage and deliver 
the certificate of title of the mortgaged vehicle to the proper 
officer for notation of that mortgage upon the certificate of title 
such an impairment of collateral as discharged her liability as 
accommodation or co-maker of the $200.00 note?" 
In reaching its decision the Wyoming Court referred to UCC/ Section 
3-606 and comment 5 to that Section. 
Comment 5 provides: 
"5. Paragraph (b) of Subsection (1) is new. The suretyship defense 
stated has been generally recognized as available to endorsers 
or accommodation parties. As to when a holder's actions in 
dealing with collateral may be "unjustifiable"/ the section on 
rights and duties with respect to collateral in the possession 
of a secured party (Section 9-207) should be consulted". 
As in Utah, the Wyoming Court found that Section 9-207 of the UCC 
provides that: 
"(1) A secured party must use reasonable care in the custody 
and preservation of collateral in his possession. In the case of 
an instrument or chattel paper reasonable care includes taking necessaicy 
steps to preserve rights against prior parties unless otherwise agreed," 
Based upon the foregoing the Wyoming Court/ at 445 P.2d 15/ 
held as follows: 
"In our view/ §34-9-207 is of assistance to Mrs. Davidson. 
She was entitled to have Shaffer exercise reasonable care in his 
custody and possession of the chattel mortgage and certificate of 
title and to take the steps necessary to perserve her rights. This 
would include the proper filing of the chattel mortage and the 
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delivery of the mortgaged property certificate of title to the proper 
official in order that notation of the mortgage encumbrance be 
endorced thereon." 
Further, the Court, at 445 P.2d 17, stated its decision as follows: 
"The evidence shows Shaffer not only accepted the promissory 
note but also the chattel mortgage upon the motor vehicle given 
by Nank and Mrs. Davidson as security for the repayment of the 
$200.00 borrowed by Nank and that Shaffer was given the certificate 
of title for the mortgaged vehicle. When Shaffer failed or 
neglected to do that which the code required him to do in order that 
the security placed in his hands became available for the protection 
of the accomodation maker of the promissory note, Shaffer discharged 
Mrs. Davidson from her obligation and erased her debt to him. 
**• 
"With respect to Mrs. Davidson's appeal from that portion of the 
court's judgment which awarded Shaffer $55.92 interest, and attorney 
fees of $60, we take note of the further fact that Shaffer claimed 
only $199.70 to be the unpaid balance due upon the note as of the 
date he brought his action. As we have already found all liability 
of Mrs. Davidson upon the $200.00 promissory note had been discharged 
by Shaffer's impairment of the security interest in the mortgage, 
only interest accruing upon any unpaid balance of the note remaining 
after applying the value of the impaired or lost mortaged property 
would be allowable. Similarly, any allowance of attorney's fees would 
be contingent upon their being due and owing some amount to Shaffer 
from Mrs. Davidson at the commencement oE this action." 
Utah Code 70A-3-415 (1) provides as follows: 
"An accommodation party is one who signs the instrument in any 
capacity for the purpose of lending his name to another party to it." 
Based upon the foregoing, appellant submits that he was discharged 
from any liability to respondent upon the subject promissory note when respondent 
and its agent, Guardian Title Company, failed to promptly record the necessary 
documents to perfect the security interest: the collateral having had a fair 
market value in excess of the amount of the promissory note. (Stipulation to 
Facts, paragraphs 11 and 17) That being the case, appellant, as explained 
i n
 Shaffer v. Davidson, supra, would also be discharged from any liability 
to respondent for interest and/or attorney's fees. 
The Court below, in a document entitled "Rulings" stated that 
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in the Court's opinion Guardian Title Conpany was the agent of both 
appellant and respondent due to the fact that documents other than 
respondent's financing statement were deposited with Guardian and one of 
such documents was a deed from appeallant and/ therefore, respondent, 
by implication, was not responsible for Guardian Title Conpanyfs failure 
to file the financing statement which would have perfected the security 
interest as respondent had instucted Guardian Title Company to do. This 
"Ruling" of the trial Court is clearly erroneous since it assumes that 
simply because Guardian Title Conpany may have been acting as the agent 
of appellant for one purpose Guardian Title Conpany could not be acting 
solely as the agent of respondent for the purpose of properly filing the 
financing statement. The trial Court's said ruling further completely 
disregards the tacts that the security interest was owned by respondent and 
not by appellant (Stipulation to Facts, paragraph 6) and that respondent 
specifically instructed Guardian Title Company to file the security interest 
concurrently and simultaneously with recordation of title to the subject 
real estate. (Stipulation to Facts, paragraph 8) 
The Court below further erred when it ruled as follows: 
"The Court is further of the opinion that in any event 
Hagan was more than an accommodation party. Hagan benefited 
from the transaction by being released from his personal 
guarantee on the real estate contract and his partnership 
was the recipient of a substantial promissory note from 
other participants in the transaction." 
The foregoing ruling appears to completely disregard the definition 
of an accommodation party contained in Utah Code Section 70A-3-415(l) and 
the parties1 stipulation that respondent insisted that appellant execute 
respondent's promissory note "as additional collateral". (Stipulation to 
Facts, paragraph 22) Said ruling also ignores the fact that the reason 
appellant's partnership received a substantial promissory note and appellant 
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was released from his personal guarantee of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was because appellant and his partnership owned a purchaser's 
interest in the subject real property (Stipulation to Facts/ paragraph 3) and 
appellant/ respondent and appellant's partnership conveyed their respective 
interests in the subject real property to defendant GR and Associates, 
(Stipulation to Facts, paragraph 5) Therefore, rather than receiving 
consideration for executing the promissory note appellant was released under 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract and his partnership received a substantial 
promissory note in return for the interest appellant and his partnership 
owned in the subject prqperty that was conveyed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING APPELLANT'S CONTENTION 
THAT APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO AVOID THE PROMISSORY NOTE DUE TO THE 
PARTIES' MUTUAL MISTAKE OF MATERIAL FACTS. 
Paragraphs 24 and 25 of the parties' Stipulation to Facts provide 
as follows: 
"24. That at the time the subject promissory note was 
executed plaintiff and defendant, C & EI Investments, Wrathall 
and Hagan, were all acting under a mistaken fact, to-wit: that 
said promissory note would be secured by the subject milling 
equipment and that said security interest would have a value equal 
to or greater than the amount due under said note. 
25. That the present parties would not have accepted or 
executed the promissory note if they had known either that 
Plaintiff would not receive a first priority security interest 
in the subject mining equipment or that there would be a delay 
in perfecting Plaintiff's security interest." 
That a mutual mistake of a material fact will work so as to 
avoid an agreement has been recognized as the law in the State of Utah. 
See for example Board of Education v. Board of Education, 85 Utah 276, 39 
P.2d 340 at 341 where the Court held " a mutual mistake as to material 
facts will avoid the agreement." and Reynolds v. Merrill, Utah, 460 P.2d 
323 at 325 wherein the Court recognized that even a general release of a 
claim for personal injury could be avoided on the ground of mutual mistake 
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as to the nature or seriousness of an injury. 
The foregoing proposition is stated by the American Law Institute's 
Restatement Of The Law, Contracts 2d, Section 152 as follows: 
"(1) Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract 
was made as to a basic assumption on which the contract was 
made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances/ 
the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party unless 
he bears the risk of the the mistake under the rule stated in 
§ 154. 
(2) In determining whether the mistake has a material effect 
on the agreed exchange of performances/ account is taken of any 
relief by way of reformation/ restitution, or otherwise." 
Illustrations provided to Section 152 quoted above numbers 3, 4 and 
5 are instructive with regard to this case. Those illustrations state as follows: 
"3. A contracts to sell and B to buy a tract of land. B 
agrees to pay A $100,000 in cash and to assume a mortgage that 
C holds on the tract. Both A and B believe that the amount of 
the mortgage is $50,000, but in fact it is only $10/000. The 
contract is voidable by A, unless the court supplies a term under 
which B is entitled to enforce the contract if he agrees to pay 
an appropriate additional sum, and B does so. 
4. A contracts to sell and B to buy a debt owed by C to A, 
and secured by a mortgage. Both A and B believe that there is a 
building on the mortgaged land so that the value of the mortgaged 
property exceeds that of the debt, but in fact there is none so 
that its value is less than half that of the debt. The contract 
is voidable by B. 
5. A contracts to assign to B for $100 a $10,000 debt owed 
to A by C, who is insolvent. Both A and B believe that the debt 
is unsecured and is therefore, virtually worthless, but in fact 
it is secured by stock worth approximately $5,000. The contract 
is voidable by A." 
Section 154 of the Second Restatement of Contracts which is referred 
to in Section 152 provides as follows: 
"§ 154. When a Party Bears the Risk of a Mistake 
A party bears the risk of a mistake when 
(a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the 
parties, or 
(b) he is aware, at the time the contract is made, 
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that he has only limited knowledge with respect to the 
facts to which the mistake relates but treats his limited 
knowledge as sufficient/ or 
(c) the risk is allocated to him by the court on the 
ground that it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so." 
As to the issue of what facts are "material" facts/ please see 
Reynolds v. Merrill/ Utah/ 460 P.2d 323/ 325, where it was held that 
a mutual mistake as to the nature or seriousness of an injury was a "material" 
mistake of fact. See also Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. Loveless/ 5 Wash. App. 551/ 
489 P.2d 368 at 370 where the Court held "a fact is material if no contract 
would have been entered into had there been no mistake concerning the fact." 
I n
 Carpenter v. Hill/ 131 Colorado 553, 283 P.2d 963, plaintiff 
and defendant entered into an agreement whereby the parties agreed that plaintiff 
would receive defendant's peach orchard in trade for plaintiff's gas station. 
Both of the parties believed the orchard was subject to a contract which 
required payment of the contract balance in "crop payments"; that is/ that one-
half of the value of the crop would go toward the contract balance and if there 
were no crop then no payment would be due. However/ the contract actually 
provided that the entire balance was due several months after the exchange occurred. 
The Colorado Supreme Court at 283 P.2d 965, held: 
"We believe that no principal is better settled than the equitable 
doctrine that an agreement founded in a mutual mistake of facts that 
are the very basis of the contract will void the contract. The fact 
concerning which the mistake was here made was the very life and 
substance of the transaction; and the mistake, not only clearly proven/ 
but admitted, is so important that recision/ if sought/ must follow." 
In the case at bar, respondent and appellant have stipulated that 
when the subject promissory note was executed and accepted both parties were 
mutually mistaken as to whether the promissory note would be secured by collateral 
which had a value in excess of the amount due on the promissory note and, further, 
that that fact was so material to both of the parties that neither would have 
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entered into the subject transaction without the erroneous belief. 
(Stipulation to Facts, paragraphs 24 and 25) 
In rejecting appellant's claim of a mutual mistake of fact the 
trial Court ruled that the failure of Guardian Title Company to perform as 
instructed by respondent was a mere failure of expectation and not a mistake 
of fact which existed at the time the transaction was closed. However/ said 
ruling fails to recognize that at the time appellant signed the subject 
promissory note respondent's promissory note was secured by the subject 
interest in milling equipment (Stipulation to Facts/ paragraph 6) there was 
to be no recording of title to the subject real estate except a simultaneous 
recording of said title with proper filing of the security interest 
(Stipulation to Facts, paragraph 8)/ the parties reasonably relied upon the 
security interest being a first-place security interest on the full and fair 
market value of the security (Stipulation to Facts, paragraph 9), appellant 
would not have executed the subject promissory note if he had not believed 
that said promissory note was fully secured and his said belief was reasonable 
(Stipulation to Facts, paragraph 12), the parties have stipulated that 
appellant and respondent, at the time the note was executed, were in fact 
acting under a mistaken fact (Stipulation to Facts, paragraph 24), and that 
none of the parties to this Appeal would have either accepted or executed 
the subject promissory note if they had not been acting under a mistake of 
fact. (Stipulation to Facts, paragraph 25) 
As shown by the facts stipulated to by the parties, at the time 
appellant signed the subject promissory note and at the time respondent 
accepted the promissory note the parties were acting under a mutual mistake 
of fact in that they believed that the subject promissory note was fully 
secured, that the security interest was a first-place security interest 
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and that it would be perfected simultaneously with the recording of the 
documents which would divest appellant/ appellant's partnership and 
respondent of their interest in the real property conveyed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing points and authorities appellant 
submits that the judgment entered in the trial Court should be reversed 
for the reasons that: 
A. The trial Court improperly ruled that appellant was not 
an accommodation party to the subject promissory note and; 
B. The trial Court improperly ruled that respondent was not 
responsible for the failure of Guardian Title Company to properly 
perfect the subject security interest and; 
C. The trial Court improperly determined that at the time 
appellant executed the subject promissory note and respondent accepted 
said promissory note appellant and respondent were not acting under a 
mutual mistake of fact when/ in fact/ said parties were acting under a 
mutual mistake of fact without which the subject promissory note would 
have been neither executed nor accepted. 
Respectfully submitted this / ~f*~ day of December/ 1984. 
$rad L. Swaner 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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